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ABSTRACT
Several observers have suggested that highly skilled workers convey little in the way of competitive
advantage for firms due to their mobility. Implicit in this view is the belief that organizations are not
important in determining the performance of such individuals. In this study, we address this issue
by examining skilled individuals who work within multiple organizations roughly simultaneously.
Specifically, we consider the performance of cardiac surgeons, many of whom perform operations
at multiple hospitals during the course of a given year. Using patient mortality as an outcome
measure, we find that the quality of a surgeon's performance at a given hospital improves
significantly with increases in his or her annual procedure volume at that hospital but does not
significantly improve with increases in his or her volume at other hospitals. Our findings suggest
that surgeon performance is not fully portable across hospitals (i.e., some portion of performance












I.    INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Managers are often quick to assert that human capital is one of the most important, if not 
the most important, asset of their firms.  In some industries, such as pharmaceuticals, software, 
and electronics, companies will compete vigorously to recruit and retain “best athletes”—those 
individuals with top scientific and technical talent.  Other firms will dedicate resources to train 
their employees in hopes of improving performance.  Drucker (2002) observes, “It is one thing 
for a company to take advantage of long-term freelance talent or to outsource the more tedious 
aspects of its human resources management.  It is quite another to forget that developing talent is 
business’s most important task—the sine qua non of competition in a knowledge economy.”  As 
has often been discussed in the literature, however, neither the best-athlete nor the training 
approach is likely to be a source of sustained competitive advantage unless human capital is firm 
specific.
1  Only when workers have skills that make their marginal productivity higher at their 
current employer than at other firms do they have a strong incentive to stay put.    
While highly skilled workers are commonly cited as a source of knowledge within firms 
(Starbuck, 1992; Argote and Ingram, 2000), it is often presumed that the human capital of these 
individuals, often referred to as knowledge workers, is not firm specific.   With respect to 
inventive activity, Arrow (1962) notes the importance of the roles played by individuals relative 
to firms.  Similarly, Coy (2002) makes the following observation concerning knowledge workers 
in high-technology firms, “They don’t qualify as assets because (obviously) they aren’t owned by 
shareholders.  The corporate crown jewels are inside their craniums, and if they walk out the 
door, shareholders can do nothing about it.”  The above view suggests that organizational context 
should not significantly affect the performance of highly skilled workers.  That is, a star will 
continue to perform like a star regardless of the organization by which he or she is employed.   
                                                           
1 Variations of this argument are presented in several papers from the resource-based view of firm 
strategy (Barney, 1986; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984).  
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A few recent studies have examined the mobility of highly skilled workers across firms 
or organizational contexts (Song, Almeida, and Wu, 2003; Baks, 2001; Groysberg, 2001; 
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2001; Almeida and Kogut, 1999).  These studies take advantage of the 
movement of workers from one firm (or setting) to another to examine the degree to which 
knowledge or performance is transferable across settings.  Our approach serves as a complement 
to these studies by examining the performance of workers in multiple firms at roughly the same 
point in time.  Specifically, we consider the performance of cardiac surgeons across multiple 
hospitals using data from every patient receiving coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery in 
Pennsylvania during 1994 and 1995.  For the most part, these surgeons are not employed by 
specific hospitals but rather have contractual relationships with multiple facilities.  In this setting, 
we can examine a given worker across several firms at a single time, thereby avoiding the need to 
control for factors, such as increased experience, that may also affect a worker’s performance as 
he or she moves sequentially from one firm to another.     
The example of cardiac surgery is particularly rich because of the team setting in which 
service is provided.  A typical cardiac surgical team includes a surgeon (i.e., the team leader), an 
anesthesiologist, nurses, and technicians.  In contrast to surgeon, the other members of these 
teams are employed by a single hospital.  By observing a surgeon’s outcomes across several 
hospitals within a given year, we are able to disaggregate performance into three components: 1) 
surgeon performance independent of the hospital; 2) hospital performance (including its 
employed staff) independent of the surgeon; and 3) the hospital-specific performance of the 
surgeon. 
We find evidence of some degree of hospital-specificity in surgeon performance.  Our 
measure of performance is a surgeon’s in-hospital mortality rate adjusted for the pre-procedure 
severity of his or her patients.  After controlling for surgeon-specific and hospital-specific 
performance, we find a positive relationship between the surgeon’s volume at a given hospital 
and his or her outcomes at that hospital.  We do not find evidence, however, of any significant 
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relationship between a surgeon’s volume at other hospitals and his or her outcomes at the 
hospital of interest.  In sum, these results suggest that surgeon performance is not fully portable 
across organizations.  Finally, we investigate the degree to which the limited portability of 
performance is due to two factors—a surgeon’s familiarity with the physical and human assets of 
an organization and his or her influence within that organization. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section II addresses issues concerning 
the portability of worker performance across organizations.  Section III describes the empirical 
setting and data.  Section IV presents our empirical specifications, Section V discusses our 
results, and Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  THE PORTABILITY OF PERFORMANCE ACROSS ORGANIZATIONS 
  
  There is a substantial literature on the degree to which knowledge can be transferred 
between organizations (see Argote and Epple (1990) for a discussion of this literature).  To 
measure the extent of this transfer, most studies examine the relationship between performance in 
an individual firm or plant and the industry-wide base of knowledge, typically measured by some 
form of cumulative output (Zimmerman, 1982; Argote, Beckman, and Epple, 1990).  An 
individual firm can benefit from the experience of other firms either by simply observing or 
hearing about that experience (e.g., informal discussion or interaction via professional 
organizations and groups) or by acquiring the key assets in which this experience resides (e.g., 
outright purchase of firms, licensing of key technologies, or employment of skilled individuals).  
Ingram and Simons (2002) consider the former form of experience transfer in their study of 
kibbutz federations in Israel.  Our analysis focuses on a specific mechanism by which the latter 
form of knowledge transfer may occur—the movement of highly skilled workers between 
organizations. 
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Beyond the level of industry-wide (i.e., public) knowledge, three broad types of factors 
can impact the performance of a highly skilled worker within a firm.  These are:  1) worker-
specific effects that are independent of the firm; 2) firm-specific effects that are independent of 
the worker; and 3) effects that are specific to worker-firm combinations.  The theoretical 
explanations for the first two effects are relatively straightforward.  For example, worker-specific 
effects might be attributed to an individual’s underlying ability or level of training, while firm-
specific effects might be due to the quality of the managerial or technological resources held by a 
given organization or the firm’s underlying ability or willingness to absorb the information 
required for innovation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  Our focus in this paper is to test for the 
presence of the third class of effects described above, worker-firm interactions.  In particular, we 
aim to identify the extent to which the performance of a surgeon at one hospital is transferable to 
another hospital.   
In theory, the three types of effects—worker, firm, and worker-firm—may be due to 
either static or dynamic factors.  For example, an individual surgeon may have superior 
performance simply because she possesses extremely good hand-eye coordination (a static effect) 
or because she has an innate capacity to improve her performance more quickly than others with 
the same level of experience (a dynamic, or learning, effect).
2  Similarly, worker-firm effects may 
result from team members simply having compatible approaches to their work from day one or 
from their learning how to work together over time.
3  While our setting provides a unique 
                                                           
2 Nelson and Winter (1982) discuss the varied nature of “routines” used by firms and note that 
certain routines may apply to firm operations at a specific point in time while others guide the process of 
modifying a firm’s operations over time.  In a related manner, Adler and Clark (1991) highlight the fact the 
first- and second-order elements of learning. 
3 In their analysis of the introduction of new technologies in factory settings, Tyre and von Hippel 
(1997) identify the importance of the organizational context in which learning occurs.  Specifically, they 
find that certain types of learning occur most effectively on the production floor while others are better 
suited to laboratory settings.  Their findings raise the question of the magnitude of within-setting (e.g., 
across production floors or across laboratories) differences in learning performance.  In related work, von 
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environment in which to test for the presence of worker-firm interactions, it does not enable us to 
address the more complex issue of distinguishing static from dynamic effects.   
 
Potential Explanations for Firm-Specific Performance 
The potential causes of worker-firm effects are subtle and merit further discussion.  One 
category of explanations for firm-specific effects revolves around the importance of familiarity 
between members of a team or organization in settings where much of the knowledge required for 
effective performance is tacit (Polanyi, 1966) rather than explicit.  For example, Edmondson, 
Bohmer, and Pisano (2001) note that well-developed surgical teams are often capable of 
performing procedures with minimal verbal communication between members.  Weick and 
Roberts (1993) suggest that team familiarity is beneficial not because it leads to habit formation, 
but rather because it provides team members with a common base of experience that fosters 
future learning.  Several studies (Katz, 1982; Berman, Down, and Hill, 2002) note that the 
relationship between familiarity and team performance may be non-linear, with the relationship 
between group longevity and performance being positive over lower values of longevity before 
becoming negative at higher levels. 
A second group of explanations attributes firm-specific individual performance to 
differences in the influence that an individual wields within particular organizations (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1988).  With respect to our empirical setting, a surgeon who performs a large 
number of surgeries at a given hospital may achieve better outcomes at that hospital than at other 
facilities, not simply because of greater familiarity with the staff in the operating room, but also 
because her high procedural volume makes her someone who is highly valued by the hospital 
and, as a result, avails her of preferential access to a hospital’s limited resources.  For example, to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Hippel (1994) suggests that context-specific differences in learning reflect variations in the “stickiness”, or 
cost of transferring, information across settings. 
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the extent that a given hospital has several anesthesiologists or nursing teams of varied quality, an 
influential surgeon (i.e., one with high volume at that facility) may be able to demand access to 
the top performers in staffing their surgical teams.  In turn, this may enable the surgeon to achieve 
better surgical outcomes.  In Section IV, we describe the empirical approach that we use first to 
determine the degree to which firm-worker effects exist and then to begin to distinguish between 
the familiarity and influence explanations for such effects. 
 
Measuring Firm-Specific Performance 
A common empirical approach for measuring the portability of skilled talent is to 
examine such individuals across multiple teams or organizations.  This approach takes advantage 
of an individual’s change of team or employer over time.  Nevertheless, the fact that an individual 
is typically employed by a single firm—or involved with a single team—at any given point in 
time, creates difficulty in distinguishing the effect of switching teams or firms from the simple 
passage of calendar time, which may exert an independent influence on performance through 
factors such as learning by doing.  Some studies control for learning by including a measure of a 
worker’s overall experience.  In settings where individuals learn at different rates, however, such 
measures may not be able to control fully for learning over time.
4
  The empirical setting for our study allows us to abstract from having to control for 
learning over time.  Specifically, we observe highly skilled individuals (i.e., surgeons) who, as 
contractors, split their time across multiple organizations (i.e., hospitals) roughly simultaneously.
5   
                                                           
4 As an analogue to differences in rates of learning across individuals, several studies discuss 
differences in the rate of learning across organizations (Argote and Epple, 1990; Pisano, Bohmer, and 
Edmondson, 2001). 
5 By “roughly simultaneously”, we mean within the course of a relatively short period of time, 
such as one week or one month.  For the purpose of protecting patient confidentiality, the Pennsylvania 
data only allows one to identify the calendar quarter—not the month or day—in which individual 
procedures were performed.  Nevertheless, most surgeons who split their time across hospitals appear to do 
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The movement of surgeons across hospitals during this period enables us to obtain separate 
estimates for each of the three effects—surgeon-specific, hospital-specific, and surgeon-hospital-
specific—described above without having to worry about dramatic changes in a surgeon’s level 
of general experience.   
 
III.  EMPIRICAL SETTING AND DATA 
 
Description of CABG 
 
Developed in the late 1960s, CABG is an invasive surgical procedure that involves taking 
a section of vein (from the leg) or artery (from the chest) and grafting it to create a bypass of 
blockage in the coronary artery.  It requires opening the patient’s chest and relies on a heart-lung 
bypass machine to perform the functions of the heart during the grafting process.  Outcomes for 
the procedure have improved substantially over time.  For example, the rate of in-hospital 
mortality for patients receiving CABG in Pennsylvania fell by 38% from 3.9% in 1990 
(Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, 1992) to 2.4% in 2000 (Pennsylvania 
Health Care Cost Containment Council, 2002).  Similarly, in New York State, the in-hospital 
mortality rate for CABG fell from 3.1% in 1991 (New York State Department of Health, 1992) to 
2.2% in 1999 (New York State Department of Health, 2002).  This improvement is typically 
attributed to learning and technological change. 
For several reasons, CABG represents an instructive setting in which to analyze the 
performance of highly skilled workers.  First, cardiac surgeons are archetypal knowledge 
workers.  They are highly trained, typically receiving up to seven years of residency and 
fellowship following their four years of medical school.  The fact that many states publicly report 
                                                                                                                                                                             
so evenly across the four quarters of the year.  We, therefore, assume that these surgeons likely split their 
time evenly within time periods shorter than calendar quarters (e.g., months or weeks). 
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CABG outcomes by surgeon suggests that these individuals are perceived as being integral to the 
quality of cardiac care. 
Second, while a surgeon is clearly a critical worker, he or she is only one member of a 
much larger surgical team that includes anesthesiologists, nurses, perfusionists, and other 
technicians.  Unlike most surgeons, the other members of a surgical team are typically employed 
by a hospital.  In addition to employing key team members, hospitals also provide a wide range of 
other organizational assets (e.g., operating room, equipment, marketing and managerial expertise) 
that may have an impact on the quality of CABG outcomes regardless of the skill of an individual 
surgeon.  
Third, there exists broad agreement concerning the appropriate measure of performance 
with respect to CABG—risk-adjusted mortality.  Much of the clinical literature on CABG uses 
some measure of in-hospital or long-term (e.g., several months to several years) mortality 
following the procedure.  This outcome is easily and accurately measured, and it is characterized 
by enough variation across doctors and hospitals to make it a meaningful dimension for 
performance evaluation.  In addition, the public reporting of CABG outcomes by hospital and 
surgeon suggests that cardiac surgeons have an incentive to perform well in terms of their risk-
adjusted mortality rates. 
Finally, CABG patients account for a significant portion of hospital revenues.  In 2000, 
over 27,000 CABG procedures were performed in Pennsylvania and the average hospital charge 
for each admission involving CABG was roughly $59,900 (Pennsylvania Health Care Cost 
Containment Council, 2002).  While charges represent the “list prices” for hospitals, the total 
revenue that Pennsylvania hospitals derived from CABG admissions—assuming that hospitals 
collected anywhere from 50% to 70% of charges—would range from $800 million to $1.1 billion.  
Scaling these figures up to the roughly 355,000 CABG patients in the United States during 1999 
(American Heart Association, 2001), suggests nationwide hospital revenues of between $10.5 
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billion and $14.5 billion for CABG patients alone.  This range represents between 3% and 4% of 
total patient revenue ($342 billion in 2000
6) for all hospitals in the United States. 
In addition to the benefits mentioned above, studying CABG within Pennsylvania allows 
testing for the firm-specific performance of skilled workers (i.e., surgeons).  There is a well-
documented relationship between annual procedure volume—for both hospitals and surgeons—
and mortality outcomes for CABG.
7  Nevertheless, prior studies have not considered the 
importance of firm-specific volume.  Given the prevalence of surgeons who split their time across 
hospitals in Pennsylvania, we are able to separate the impact of a surgeon’s hospital-specific 
volume from that of his or her volume at other hospitals.
8  When coupled with the high levels of 
training and status held by many cardiac surgeons, this tendency to split effort across 
organizations positions these physicians as potential “gatekeepers” or “boundary spanners” (Allen 
and Cohen, 1969; Tushman, 1977).   
 
Data 
  The data for this analysis are from the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment 
Council (PHC4) and include patient-level records for every individual receiving CABG at a 
hospital in Pennsylvania in 1994 or 1995.  These data cover more than 38,000 procedures 
performed by 203 surgeons operating at 43 hospitals.  In addition to identifying the hospital and 
surgeon for each procedure, the PHC4 data also provide a broad range of demographic and 
clinical information for each patient.  This information includes patient age, gender, illness 
                                                           
6 Health Forum (2002). 
7 Luft, Bunker, Enthoven (1979), Showstack et al. (1987), and Pisano, Bohmer, and Edmondson 
(2001), find evidence of a positive relationship between volume and outcome for CABG at the hospital 
level.  Hannan et al. (1989) and Hannan et al. (1991) find evidence of a similar relationship at the surgeon 
level. 
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severity upon hospital admission, and a series of variables indicating the presence of particular 
comorbidities such as kidney failure, heart failure, and acute myocardial infarction (i.e., heart 
attack).  PHC4 uses this information to create risk-adjusted measures of in-hospital mortality by 
surgeon and hospital (Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, 1998a). 
 
Splitters and Non-Splitters  
The potential explanations for why surgeons split their time across multiple hospitals are 
numerous.  For example, surgeons with strong reputations may draw patients from a relatively 
broad geography and may offer multiple hospital options to ensure patient convenience.  In a 
related vein, many surgeons are members of multi-physician group practices.  To the extent that 
surgeons provide coverage for their colleagues—who tend to practice at different hospitals—one 
would expect to see some degree of splitting activity.  Finally, splitting patterns may have 
emerged from the increase in mergers and other affiliations between hospitals in the 1990s.  To 
the extent that these transactions linked multiple hospitals, each of which had its own CABG 
program, one might expect to see surgeons splitting their time across these facilities as part of a 
“systemwide” CABG program.  The PHC4 data does not provide information as to which, if any, 
of the above factors explain splitting behavior.  As such, this paper focuses on the effects, rather 
than the causes, of this activity. 
To the extent that surgeons might decide to perform particular types of cases at specific 
hospitals, the causality between splitting behavior and operating outcomes is not clear.  We 
address these causality issues with multivariate techniques later in the paper.  At this point, 
however, we provide simple comparisons of volumes and performance for “splitters” and “non-
splitters.”  For this initial analysis, we consider a surgeon to be a splitter during a particular 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 In other states that track the performance of CABG surgeons, such as New York, there is a much 
smaller percentage of surgeons who split their time across multiple hospitals.  
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quarter of the calendar year if he or she performed at least one procedure at each of two or more 
hospitals during that quarter.  Based on this criterion, roughly 30% of the cardiac surgeons in the 
sample were splitters during the average quarter during the sample period.  Further, surgeons who 
were splitters in one quarter tended to be a splitter in the subsequent quarter; the correlation 
between being a splitter in the current quarter and the prior quarter is 0.82. 
Table 1 provides a comparison of procedural volumes and risk-adjusted mortality rates 
for splitters versus non-splitters.  Each observation represents a surgeon in a given three-month 
quarter during the 1994-1995 period.  The average splitter performed 5.9 (22%) more procedures 
per quarter than the average non-splitter, and this difference is significant at the 1% level.  We 
note that the lower CABG volume of non-splitters does not appear to be due to their substituting 
non-CABG surgeries, such as valve replacements, for CABG procedures.  In fact, the average 
number of non-CABG surgeries is very small—roughly one per quarter—for both groups. 
Prior to comparing the performance of splitters and non-splitters with respect to their 
risk-adjusted mortality rates (RAMRs), we provide a brief discussion of how this dependent 
variable is calculated.  Given heterogeneity in the severity of patients’ pre-operative conditions, 
raw (i.e., observed) mortality rates represent potentially biased measures of the quality of surgeon 
performance.  In particular, higher quality surgeons may attract patients with more severe forms 
of CAD, who are more likely to die in the hospital independent of provider quality.  To mitigate 
this bias, PHC4 performs logistic regression using several clinical variables as controls to risk-
adjust the mortality rates for surgeons and hospitals.
9  Each observation corresponds to an 
individual CABG procedure, and the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if a patient 
                                                           
9 The estimates for this regression using the 1994 and 1995 Pennsylvania data can be found in the 
report released by PHC4 in 1998 (Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, 1998b).  Similar 
techniques are used by other states including New York (New York State Department of Health, 2002), 
New Jersey (New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, 2001), and California (Damberg, 
Chung, and Steimle, 2001). 
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dies in the hospital and zero otherwise.  For each patient, the PCH4 calculates a predicted 
probability of death based on the fitted values obtained from the logistic regression. 
  Using this information on observed and predicted mortality, we calculate the RAMR for 
surgeon s at hospital h as follows: 
 
RAMRs,h=(OMRs,h/EMRs,h)*OMRstate                  (1) 
 
where OMRs,h and EMRs,h are the average observed and expected mortality rates, respectively, 
across all of surgeon s’ patients at hospital h in a given time period.  This ratio is then multiplied 
by OMRstate, the average observed mortality rate for the entire state over the same period, to 
normalize the RAMR.
10  As illustrated in the second row of Table 1, we find that the RAMR for 
splitters is slightly higher than that for non-splitters, though these rates are not significantly 
different at conventional levels.
11
  Table 2 offers illustrative data on the performance and case volumes for a few splitters in 
the sample.  These surgeons were not selected at random, but rather were chosen because of the 
relatively stark differences in their performance across hospitals.  For example, Surgeon D’s 
observed mortality rate at Hospital 1—where he performed roughly two-thirds of his cases—was 
0.7%.  By comparison, the observed mortality for his cases at Hospital 2 was nearly 10 times as 
large at 6.8%.  Analysis of Surgeon D’s risk-adjusted mortality rates suggests that this difference 
was not simply due to his performing on sicker patients at Hospital 2 than at Hospital 1.  Even 
after risk-adjustment, his mortality rate at Hospital 2 was still five times that at Hospital 1.  Our 
                                                           
10 Later in the paper, we also calculate similar risk-adjusted rates, RAMRp and RAMRh, at the 
surgeon and hospital levels, respectively.  
11 An analysis cardiac surgeon performance in Pennsylvania in 2000 found that patients treated by 
surgeons affiliated with more than one hospital were significantly more likely to be readmitted to the 
hospital within both seven and 30 days.  This finding suggests that splitting activity was correlated with 
lower quality in Pennsylvania in 2000 (Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, 2000). 
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multivariate analysis described in the next section enables us to disentangle whether such 
performance differences are due to underlying differences in hospital quality or to specific 
interactions between surgeons and hospitals.   
 
IV.   EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
The summary analysis of splitters and non-splitters does not account for unobserved 
heterogeneity between the two groups.  This heterogeneity may be due to systematic differences 
in performance between splitting and non-splitting surgeons or differences in the quality of the 
hospitals at which the two types of doctors tend to practice.  Further, the simple binary 
comparison of splitters and non-splitters does not account for the potential continuous effect that 
splitting may have on performance.  For example, one might expect that a surgeon who spends 90 
percent of his time at a given hospital—while technically a splitter—would not have performance 
that differs much from an otherwise identical non-splitter.  To address both of these issues, we 
estimate multivariate regression models that incorporate controls for underlying surgeon and 
hospital quality as well as continuous measures for the level of splitting activity by individual 
surgeons.  The unit of observation for this analysis is the individual CABG procedure.  Table 3 
provides summary statistics for the key variables used in these regressions. 
 
Total Surgeon Volume 
Before examining the portability of skill across organizations, we need to establish the 
basic relationship between a surgeon’s total (i.e., across all hospitals) volume of procedures and 
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MORTi,s,h is an indicator equal to one if patient i—who received CABG from surgeon s at hospital 
h—at died in the hospital and zero otherwise.  To reduce concerns regarding reverse causality, we 
lag all of the other independent variables by one quarter.  Thus, TOTCASEs,q-1 is the number of 
CABG cases performed by surgeon s at all Pennsylvania hospitals the prior quarter. 
To control for the fact that surgeons and hospitals have different underlying levels of 
quality due to factors that are independent of procedure volume, we include two additional 
variables.  The first, RAMRs,q-1, is the risk-adjusted mortality rate for surgeon s across all 
hospitals in the prior quarter; this variable captures the effect of surgeon quality on performance.  
Similarly, the second variable, RAMRh,q-1, is the same measure for hospital h across all surgeons 
in the prior quarter; it controls for the impact of hospital quality on outcomes.  Finally, Zi is a 
vector that includes all of the patient-level clinical variables described in the previous section as 
well as fixed effects for each calendar quarter.  To address any lack of independence in the error 
terms, we cluster the standard errors in (2) by surgeon. 
 
Facility-Specific Surgeon Volume 
To examine the portability of surgeon performance across hospitals, we also estimate a 
variant of (2) in which a surgeon’s total volume of procedures in the prior quarter is divided into 
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SPLITs,q-1 is an indicator variable equal to one if surgeon s split his or her time between multiple 
Pennsylvania hospitals in the prior quarter and zero otherwise.  HOSPCASEs,h,q-1 is the number of 
CABG cases performed by surgeon s at hospital h in the prior quarter, and OTHCASEs,h,q-1 is the 
number of cases performed by that surgeon at all Pennsylvania hospitals other than h in the prior 
quarter.  β1 measures the degree to which the mortality rate for splitters differs, on average, from 
that for non-splitters.  Interacting SPLIT with OTHCASE allows us to measure the impact of 
volume at other hospitals after controlling for the fact that the value of OTHCASE for non-
splitters will be zero by definition.  The difference between β2 and β3 thus captures the degree of 
hospital-specificity in the volume-outcome relationship.   
As a proxy for a surgeon’s level of influence at a particular hospital, we introduce the 
variable SHAREs,h,q-1, which represents the CABG volume of surgeon s at hospital h as a share of 
hospital h’s total CABG volume in the prior quarter.  Given the high level of hospital profit 
generated by CABG procedures (Huckman, 2002), we believe that SHARE represents a good 
proxy for a surgeon’s ability to command resources from a particular organization.  The financial 
resources that hospitals spend recruiting surgeons and advertising the quality of their cardiac 
surgery underscore the value of a high-volume cardiac surgeon to a particular organization.  We 
include SHARE to begin to distinguish between the familiarity and influence explanations for 
firm-specific performance that are discussed in Section II.  In regressions that include SHARE, we 
can thus view the coefficient on HOSPCASE as a measure of how performance depends on a 
surgeon’s familiarity with a specific hospital after controlling for his or her influence or ability to 
command superior resources from that institution. 
Table 4 summarizes our hypotheses concerning the direction of the coefficients on the 
independent variables in (3).  Based on the substantial literature suggesting the presence of 
volume-outcome effects for cardiac surgeons, we would expect the coefficients on both 
HOSPCASE and OTHCASE to be negative.  Our test for the importance of firm-specific 
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experience focuses on the relative magnitudes and significance of these two coefficients.  In the 
extreme case of no firm-specificity in experience, these coefficients would be identical.  Under 
the hypothesis that some portion of experience is firm specific, one would expect the coefficient 
on HOSPCASE to be greater in absolute magnitude (i.e., more negative) than that on OTHCASE.  
With respect to the remaining variables, we would not expect the issue of firm-specificity to 
affect the direction of the coefficients.  For both the lagged surgeon (RAMRs,q-1) and hospital 
(RAMRh,q-1) quality variables, we would expect the coefficients to be positive.  That is, higher 
quality (i.e., lower mortality) in the prior year is indicative of a high level of surgeon- or hospital-
specific quality that will affect mortality in the current period.  Finally, we would expect the 
coefficient on SHARE to be negative in both cases, as greater influence within the hospital should 
help improve a surgeon’s access to resources and, in turn, his or her performance. 
 
V.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
  
Table 5 shows the results for regressions using total surgeon volume (i.e., across all 
hospitals).  Column 1 illustrates that an increase in a surgeon’s total volume in the prior year is 
correlated with a reduction in RAMR.  This negative coefficient, which is significant at the 1% 
level, is consistent in direction with the hypothesized volume-outcome effect that has been 
observed at the physician level in prior studies (Hannan et al., 1989; Hannan et al., 1991).  The 
rows toward the bottom of the table reveal that an increase of one standard deviation in total cases 
is correlated with a decrease of 0.26 percentage points in the probability of mortality.  Relative to 
the predicted probability of mortality evaluated at the means of the independent variables (1.8%), 
this change represents a decline of 14.4%.
12   
                                                           
12 Relative to the unconditional probability of mortality in the sample (3.1%), this represents a 
decline of 8.4%. 
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The addition of controls for surgeon RAMR and hospital RAMR does not substantially 
affect the magnitude or significance of the coefficient on total surgeon cases (Column 2).  It is not 
surprising that the coefficient on surgeon RAMR is positive and highly significant, as surgeons 
with worse results across all hospitals in the prior quarter would be expected to have worse results 
at hospital h in the current period.  While the direction of the coefficient on the lagged hospital 
RAMR is negative—which runs counter to our expectation—it is not significant at conventional 
levels.  One interpretation of the results for these two controls is that the underlying quality of the 
surgeon is more important than that of the hospital in determining the quality of future outcomes 
for the surgeon-hospital pair.  Alternatively, the high insignificant and counterintuitive coefficient 
on hospital RAMR could simply be due to the correlation (0.35) between the surgeon RAMR and 
hospital RAMR variables.  We are not concerned about our inability to distinguish between these 
two explanations empirically.  Rather, we are more interested in making sure that we control for 
the effects of underlying quality at both the surgeon and hospital level, and this specification 
achieves that goal.  
  Column 1 of Table 6 decomposes a surgeon’s total case volume into those performed at 
hospital h (HOSPCASE) and those occurring elsewhere (SPLIT x OTHCASE).  Both coefficients 
are negative, but that on HOSPCASE is significant at 1%, while that on SPLIT x OTHCASE is 
much smaller in magnitude and insignificant at conventional levels.  An increase of one standard 
deviation in HOSPCASE is associated with a decline of 0.34 percentage points (18.9%) relative to 
the average predicted probability.  For SPLIT x OTHCASE, a similar increase of one standard 
deviation results in a decline of only 0.01 percentage points which, again, is insignificant at 
conventional levels.   
Further, the coefficient on HOSPCASE is not only significantly different from zero, but it 
is also significantly different from the SPLIT x OTHCASE at the 3% level.  This latter result 
provides additional evidence of the firm-specificity in surgeon performance.  More precisely, a 
surgeon’s volume at a given hospital affects his or her outcomes at that hospital significantly 
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more than does his or her volume at other hospitals.  The relative magnitude and significance of 
these key coefficients does not change meaningfully as we add controls for surgeon RAMR 
(Column 2) and hospital RAMR (Column 3).  In addition, the coefficients on HOSPCASE and 
SPLIT x OTHCASE remain significantly different from each other at the 3% level. 
As one check on the robustness of this result, we replace lagged hospital quality 
(RAMRh,q-1) with hospital fixed effects (Column 4).  This specification accounts for the possibility 
that mortality outcomes may be affected by fixed, hospital-level variables that are not fully 
captured by lagged quality.  We find that the results from the first three columns are robust to this 
alternate specification.  The coefficient on HOSPCASE remains similar terms of both magnitude 
and significance, and, though the coefficient on SPLIT x OTHCASE shifts from being slightly 
negative to slightly positive, its magnitude remains small and it is insignificant at conventional 
levels.
13  Finally, the coefficients on HOSPCASE and SPLIT x OTHCASE are significantly 
different from each other at the 3% level. 
  The results in Columns 1 through 4 provide evidence of firm-specificity in surgeon 
performance, but they do not explain the degree to which that hospital specificity is driven by 
familiarity or surgeon influence.  To begin to understand these mechanisms, we add SHARE to 
the basic regression (Column 5).  The estimated coefficient on SHARE has the predicted negative 
sign, though it is only significant at the 13% level.  This result, in combination with the slight 
decline in the absolute magnitude of the HOSPCASE coefficient, suggests that surgeon influence 
plays some role in explaining the firm-specificity of performance.  Nevertheless, the relationship 
between the HOSPCASE and SPLIT x OTHCASE coefficients remains similar to that in the 
previous columns.  We note that these two coefficients are now different from each other at only 
                                                           
13 To account for the potential lack of independence among observations, the standard errors in 
this regression are clustered by surgeon.  In terms of the significance of the key coefficients—HOSPCASE 
and SPLIT x OTHCASE—the results from Column 4 of Table 6 are robust to clustering observations by 
hospital. 
18  
the 13% level of significance.  It is possible that this result is due to the relatively high correlation 
between HOSPCASE and SHARE.
14  Overall, this regression suggests that, even after controlling 
for a surgeon’s influence within a particular hospital, his or her volume at that facility still plays a 
significant role in determining performance.  This finding points to the importance of familiarity, 
as well as influence, in explaining the hospital-specific performance of surgeons. 
  
The Magnitude of Splitting Effects 
  Using the results from Column 5 of Table 6, we conduct a thought experiment to estimate 
the magnitude of the impact that splitting has on the performance of the average splitter and on 
overall mortality in Pennsylvania.  First, we consider the impact of moving all of the volume for a 
typical splitter to a single hospital.  To facilitate this calculation, we assume that all splitters begin 
with risk-adjusted mortality rates that are equal to the median rate across all surgeons (3.00%) for 
the 1994-1995 period.  To keep our estimates conservative, we assume that the conversion of 
splitters to non-splitters would occur by moving the smallest number of patients.  For each 
splitter, we thus move all patients to their predominant hospital (i.e., the facility at which that 
surgeon performs the plurality of his or her procedures).  Table 7 illustrates the impact of moving 
various percentages of a splitter’s volume to his or her predominant hospital.  We consider 
movements that vary within roughly one standard deviation (25% of volume) of the mean shift 
required to convert splitters into non-splitters.  These figures assume an average volume of 33 
cases per splitter per calendar quarter.  As suggested by the table, moving all volume to the 
predominant hospital would decrease the RAMR for a splitter by between 0.08 (for a 90/10 
splitter) and 0.32 (for a 60/40 splitter) percentage points.  Relative to the median RAMR of 3.00 
                                                           
14 The correlation between SHARE and HOSPCASE is 0.52.  Given that HOSPCASE represents 
the numerator of SHARE, a surgeon with a large volume of cases at hospital h would be likely to represent 
a substantial share of hospital h’s total volume.   
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percent across all surgeons, these changes represent declines of between 2.7% and 10.7%, 
respectively.  Alternatively, these declines would improve a surgeon who is at the 50
th percentile 
in terms of RAMR to between the 43
rd and 48
th percentile of RAMR. 
We also consider the impact of moving all splitters’ cases to their predominant hospital 
on statewide mortality (i.e., across all surgeons).  We again assume that all surgeons and hospitals 
have underlying mortality rates that are equal to the statewide average.  Based on the actual 
values of HOSPCASE and OTHCASE, we determined that slightly more than 1,400 patients per 
year would move between hospitals to convert all splitters into non-splitters.  Shifting these 
patients would decrease the statewide mortality rate by 0.06 percentage points, or roughly two 
percent of its average value for the 1994-1995 period.  This improvement translates into a 
reduction of roughly 12 deaths per year throughout Pennsylvania (relative to the statewide 
average of 598 per year during 1994-1995).   
Both of the above calculations must be qualified by the fact that they are based on the 
simplifying assumption of no underlying quality differences between surgeons and between 
hospitals.  Nevertheless, they represent a reasonable first pass at estimating the magnitude of the 
performance benefit—in terms of reduced mortality— that would result from converting all 




  The empirical setting considered in this paper is particularly well suited for examining 
firm-specificity in the performance of skilled workers; it enables us to observe many individuals, 
each of whom is working within multiple organizations.  Further, the well-established 
relationship between surgeon volume and clinical outcomes serves as a convenient means of 
correlating an individual’s degree of contact with a given firm to his or her performance at that 
organization.  We find a substantial degree of firm-specificity in surgeon performance.  More 
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precisely, higher annual volume for a given surgeon at a particular hospital is correlated with 
significantly lower risk-adjusted mortality for that surgeon-hospital pair.  That volume, however, 
does not significantly improve the surgeon’s performance at other hospitals (i.e., surgeon 
performance is not fully portable across organizations).   
Based on our preliminary analysis—which uses a surgeon’s share of a hospital’s total 
CABG volume as a measure of his or her influence within that organization—we find that firm-
specificity in surgeon performance is not simply an artifact of a surgeon’s influence or power 
within a particular hospital.  That is, this effect is not solely explained by the fact that a surgeon 
with high volume at a given hospital may be able to command superior resources from that 
hospital’s administrators.  Rather this relationship also reflects the productive benefits associated 
with a surgeon’s familiarity with critical assets of the hospital organization.  The specific nature 
of these key organizational assets—which may be specific employees, team structures, or 
operating routines—represents an area for future research. 
  Below we discuss some potential limitations and extensions of our analysis.  First, our 
results are based on only one type of highly skilled worker (i.e., cardiac surgeons).  It is, 
therefore, possible that the pattern of organization-specific performance that we identify may not 
be as strong in other settings.  For example, in cases where firms are exploring knowledge that is 
“technologically distant” (Song, Almeida, and Wu, 2003) from their current areas of expertise, 
there may be more benefits associated with splitting as a means of knowledge transfer.  Offsetting 
this possible limitation of our analysis, however, is the benefit of the rich detail that our data 
provide about the degree of splitting activity for individual workers and the quality of their 
performance within different organizations.   
Second, our analysis might benefit from a deeper panel with additional years of data for 
each surgeon and hospital.  While Pennsylvania has made data for 2000 available for purchase by 
researchers, information for the years from 1996 to 1999 is not available, thus creating gaps in 
efforts to create a continuous panel from 1994 to 2000.  Finally, the share-based proxy for 
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surgeon influence enables us to make suggestive, but not definitive, statements concerning the 
roles of familiarity and influence in explaining firm-specific performance.  More detailed 
observational or anecdotal data might provide additional insight concerning this distinction.   
  Despite these potential limitations, this study has implications for managers both within 
and beyond the health care industry.  First, it sheds light on strategies for allocating skilled 
workers across divisions or projects within a firm.  For example, firms that manage a portfolio of 
simultaneous R&D initiatives (e.g., software or electronics companies) must determine how to 
staff engineers to various projects.  Similarly, diversified firms must decide how to allocate finite 
managerial resources and attention across individual business units.  Consistent with Wheelwright 
and Clark (1992), our findings imply that these skilled workers may achieve superior outcomes, 
all else equal, to the extent that they limit the splitting of their time across multiple organizational 
settings or units.  In addition, our results should encourage managers to take a more critical eye to 
the practice of building firm capabilities through the “best-athlete” strategy of hiring.  Particularly 
when a highly skilled worker must interact with a complex array of other assets—human and 
physical—within a given firm, the performance of that worker may not be easily transferred 
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CABG Cases/Surgeon Per Calendar Quarter 
(1994 and 1995 Combined) 32.9      17.7         27.0         17.0           ***
Risk-Adjusted Mortality Rate (1994 and 1995 
Combined) 3.35% 3.42% 3.01% 4.24%
Note:  *,**,*** denote that the mean value for splitters and non-splitters are significantly different at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  The level of observation is a surgeon for a given calendar quarter.  A 
surgeon is a "splitter" for a given quarter if he or she performed at least one CABG procedure at each of 
two or more hospitals in Pennsylvania during that quarter. 












Hospital 1 220 2.7% 2.9%
Hospital 2 54 5.6% 4.8%
Doctor B
Hospital 1 140 0.6% 0.7%
Hospital 2 98 2.0% 2.0%
Doctor C
Hospital 1 186 2.7% 2.8%
Hospital 2 38 7.9% 11.0%
Doctor D
Hospital 1 143 0.7% 0.7%
Hospital 2 74 6.8% 3.6%
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MORT i,s,h: Did CABG Patient Die in Hospital? 34,173 3.1% 17.3%
TOTCASE s,q-1: Total Surgeon Cases (Lagged) 34,173 36.8 17.4
HOSPCASE s,h,q-1: Surgeon Cases at Hospital (Lagged) 34,173 32.3 17.7
OTHCASE s,h,q-1: Surgeon Cases at Other Hospitals (Lagged) 34,173 4.5 10.0
RAMR s,q-1: Surgeon RAMR (Lagged) 33,610 3.1% 4.5%
RAMR h,q-1: Hospital RAMR (Lagged) 34,171 3.1% 1.9%
SHARE s,h,q-1: Surgeon Share of Total Hospital Cases (Lagged) 34,171 27.0% 20.0%
 
Note:  Data covers all CABG procedures at hospitals in Pennsylvania for the last three quarters of 1994 




Table 4:  Hypothesized Direction of Coefficients in Base Regression 
 
Variable Description
If Perfomance Is Firm-Specific 
(i.e., Limited Portability)
If Perfomance Is Not Firm-Specific 
(i.e., Full Portability)
HOSPCASE s,h,q-1
Total CABG cases performed by 
surgeon s at hospital h in prior 
quarter
Negative Negative
SPLIT s,q-1 x OTHCASE s,h,q-1
For splitters only, the total CABG 
cases performed by surgeon s at 
facilities other than hospital h in 
prior quarter
Negative but not as large or 
significant as HOSPCASE 
coefficient
Negative and of roughly the same 
magnitude and significance as the 
HOSPCASE coefficient
RAMR s,q-1
Risk-adjusted mortality rate for 




Risk-adjusted mortality rate for 




CABG cases performed by 
surgeon s at hospital h as a 
percentage of hospital h's total 
CABG cases in prior quarter
Negative Negative
Hypothesized Effect on Likelihood of Mortality
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Table 5:  Logistic Regression with Total Surgeon Volume 
 
 
TOTCASE s,q-1: -0.0087 *** -0.0090 ***
Total Surgeon Cases (Lagged) (0.0023) (0.0024)
RAMR s,q-1: 0.9293 **
Surgeon RAMR (Lagged) (0.4826)
RAMR h,q-1: -0.3233
Hospital RAMR (Lagged) (1.7905)
-3.4194 *** -3.7491 ***
(1.2815) (1.2841)
1.80% 1.80%
Impact of One Standard Deviation Increase in:




Wald Chi-Squared 1941.8 *** 1933.3 ***
Average Predicted Probability of Mortality (Evaluated at Means 
of Independent Variables)
Dependent Variable:  Did CABG 
Patient Die in Hospital?
Note:  *,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  The following 
variables are included in the regressions, but are not shown in the table:  age, age
2/100, fixed effects 
for quarter of calendar year, and indicators for cardiogenic shock, concurrent angioplasty, complicated 
hypertension, dialysis, female gender, heart failure, and prior CABG or heart valve surgery.  
Observations are weighted by the number of procedures for each surgeon-hospital pairing.  Standard 




Table 6:  Logistic Regression with Hospital-Specific Volume and Volume at Other Facilities 
 
SPLIT s,q-1: 0.0243 0.0178 0.0202 0.0426 -0.0073
Did Surgeon Split Across Hospitals? (Lagged) (0.1001) (0.0989) (0.0994) (0.1228) (0.0993)
HOSPCASE s,h,q-1: -0.0111 *** -0.0106 *** -0.0106 *** -0.0101 *** -0.0084 ***
Surgeon Cases at Hospital (Lagged) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0026)
SPLIT s,q-1 x OTHCASE s,h,q-1: -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0018 -0.0005
SPLIT s,q-1 x Surgeon Cases at Other Hospitals (Lagged) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0050)
RAMR s,q-1: 1.1102 * 1.2110 * -0.0075 1.1602 *
Surgeon RAMR (Lagged) (0.6631) (0.6830) (0.7714) (0.6806)
RAMR h,q-1: -0.7730 -0.7673
Hospital RAMR (Lagged) (1.8216) (1.8303)
SHARE s,h,q-1: -0.0043
Surgeon Share of Total Hospital Cases (Lagged) (0.0028)
-3.7927 *** -3.8508 *** -3.8246 *** -4.9982 *** -3.7580 ***
(1.2712) (1.2808) (1.2849) (1.3074) (1.2845)
Hospital Fixed Effects? No No No Yes No
1.80% 1.80% 1.80% 1.70% 1.80%
Impact of One Standard Deviation Increase in:
Surgeon Cases at Hospital -0.34% -0.32% -0.33% -0.28% -0.26%
Surgeon Cases at Other Hospitals -0.01% -0.003% -0.01% 0.04% -0.01%
3% 3% 3% 3% 13%
Observations 33,584 33,584 33,584 33,584 33,584
Pseudo R
2 0.1762 0.1764 0.1764 0.1843 0.1768
Wald Chi-Squared 2035.9 *** 2043.4 *** 2067.2 *** 4740.3 *** 2225.8 ***
Dependent Variable:  Did CABG Patient Die in Hospital?
Note:  *,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  The following variables are included in the regressions, but 
are not shown in the table:  age, age2/100, fixed effects for quarter of calendar year, and indicators for cardiogenic shock, concurrent angioplasty, 
complicated hypertension, dialysis, female gender, heart failure, and prior CABG or heart valve surgery.  Observations are weighted by the number of 
procedures for each surgeon-hospital pairing.  Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by surgeon.
(4) (2) (3) (1)
Constant
Average Predicted Probability of Mortality (Evaluated at Means 
of Independent Variables)




Table 7:  Performance Impact of Converting Splitters to Non-Splitters 
 
Split Ratio (Predominant/Other)







60/40 13 -0.32 From 50 to 43
70/30 10 -0.24 From 50 to 44
80/20 7 -0.16 From 50 to 46
90/10 3 -0.08 From 50 to 48
*
**
Impact on RAMR (Relative to 
Median = 3.00%)
Assumes an annual average of 33 CABG cases per splitter per calendar quarter.
Given that a lower RAMR is associated with higher quality, shifting all of a surgeon's volume to the 
predominant hospital will reduce that surgeon's RAMR percentile rank.  The baseline RAMR of 3.00% is the 
median across all surgeons in Pennsylvania for the 1994-1995 period.
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